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For decades oil and gas corporations have been major contributors to global warming and its 
harmful effects on the environment and economy.  Yet global efforts to hold these and other 
carbon-intensive companies accountable and pressure them to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGs) have so far been ineffective.  Corporate environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) ratings have the potential to help drive down GHG emissions, by measuring and comparing 
how different companies are managing their impact on the environment.  ESG ratings have existed 
over 20 years and are a thriving niche in the financial services sector, but their lack of consistency 
and credibility have limited their influence.  With some modifications, ESG ratings could help 
hold companies accountable for their environmental performance, similarly to how corporate 
credit ratings hold companies accountable for their creditworthiness.   
The contribution of this paper is a proposal for strengthening existing ESG ratings through 
standardization, regulation, and greater focus on GHG emissions.  The proposal draws on elements 
of the corporate credit rating system and related financial regulations.  The goal of the proposal is 
to establish a rating framework that would increase transparency and accountability regarding 
corporate GHG emissions and other impacts on the environment.  Such a framework would clearly 
identify environmental leaders and laggards for investors, who could direct their capital 
accordingly.  As a result, corporations would have incentive to adopt more sustainable business 
strategies and practices to earn favorable ratings and retain access to capital.   
There would likely be resistance to the proposed framework from fossil fuel producers, existing 




The proposal has on its side, however, converging scientific, financial, and political trends, 
including: 1) the steady rise of global temperatures; 2) increasing demand by investors representing 
trillions of dollars in assets for more information about how corporations are managing climate 
risk; 3) reinvigorated climate action under the new U.S. administration.  The proposed framework 
is intended to supplement other, more substantial contributions to global efforts to achieve Paris 
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Greenhouse gas emissions and global warming continue to rise 
 
The United States and 193 other countries have signed the 2015 UN/Paris Climate Agreement, 
which set widely-accepted targets and guidelines for halting global warming before it reaches 
catastrophic levels (IPCC, 2018).  With greenhouse gas emissions still rising, 2020 is on course to 
be one of the three hottest years on record, despite the pandemic and resulting global recession 
(WMO, 2020).  The UN Environment Program estimates that fossil fuel production would have to 
decrease by 6% per year to align with Paris, but instead as of December 2020 it was projected to 
increase by 2% per year through 2030 (Galey, 2020).    
Could investors and the market help drive down emissions? 
 
While fossil fuel production will likely remain profitable and in demand for decades to come (EIA, 
2019), its adverse impacts on the environment are creating rising financial risk, including for oil 
and gas companies and investors.  Investors seeking to reduce risk are therefore pressing publicly 
traded corporations to adopt more environmentally friendly practices, by directing capital away 
from major polluters and towards companies committed to sustainable business practices (WEF, 
2020).  Institutional investors representing over $80 trillion in assets have committed to 
incorporate environmental factors in investment decisions (PRI, 2020).  The results of such 
investor pressure have been mixed.  On one hand, over 12,000 companies, including oil and gas 
producers, have signed the UN Global Compact, which commits firms to promote greater 
environmental responsibility (UN Global Compact, n.d.).  Major oil and gas companies have 
declared their support for Paris targets and made voluntary commitments to reduce their carbon 
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intensity accordingly (OGCI, 2020).  Such investor pressure may have contributed to Exxon’s 
decline in market value from $450 billion in 2013 to $180 billion in 2020, and to the once largest 
company in the world being dropped from the Dow Jones Industrial Average (Langley, 2020).  On 
the other hand, none of the oil and gas majors has committed to an absolute reduction in emissions, 
none is on a Paris-compatible pathway, and none appears to have a clear strategy in place for 
meeting their announced commitments (Coffin, 2020; Wang, 2018; Global Carbon Project, 2019).  
Oil and gas companies instead continue to pursue investments, operations, and sales that are far 
from Paris-compatible (Coffin, 2020).  Exxon Mobil, for example, has never committed to reduce 
emissions or reach carbon neutrality by a certain date, and its most recent business plan will result 
in a 17% increase in GHG emissions by 2025 (Crowley, 2020).   
The need for more transparency and accountability 
 
Fossil fuel producers continue to explore, extract, produce, and sell oil and gas partly because of 
ongoing demand but also because investor pressure has yet to reach a level sufficient to convince 
producers to change their business strategies.  To be more convincing, investor pressure needs to 
be more targeted, so that it consistently punishes environmental laggards and rewards leaders.  To 
focus and leverage their pressure, however, investors need 1) clear information about how 
companies are managing their GHG emissions relative to peers and 2) an effective global 
framework for holding oil and gas companies accountable for their emissions.  Both requirements 
are currently lacking.  Companies are not obliged to inform the public fully about their emissions, 
let alone reduce them.  There is no effective global accountability framework.  Consequently, 
companies can produce and sell as much fossil fuels as the market will bear, flout Paris targets, 
and pledge reductions without having to implement them.  Coercive measures such as legal action 
against corporations or financers are costly and time-consuming and have not yet produced 
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significant change (Sarlieve, 2020).  Policy measures such as the EU’s emissions trading scheme 
or carbon taxes create incentives for companies to shift away from fossil fuels towards lower 
emission energy sources, but such initiatives are costly to administer, politically controversial, and 
require legislation so far unattainable in the U.S. Congress (Timmons, 2015).   
 
A less costly and controversial approach to incentivize the shift away from fossil fuels would be 
to create a market-based framework for holding corporations accountable for their GHG emissions.  
The framework would 1) provide detailed information about how each company is managing its 
current and projected emissions as well as other environmental impacts, and 2) rate and compare 
how companies within a given sector, e.g. oil and gas, are performing with respect to emissions 
and other environmental indicators.  Investors, climate advocates, and policymakers would be able 
to use the framework to identify and target environmental leaders and laggards more 
systematically, and to direct investment capital accordingly.  As investor decisions increasingly 
favor companies that manage climate risks and impacts well (and shun companies that do it 
poorly), there would be competitive pressure on fossil fuel companies to literally clean up their 
act, including by reducing their emissions.  The combination of transparency (actionable 
information on each company’s emissions performance) and consequences (investor decisions 
based on that information) would provide accountability and incentives for change that are 
currently lacking.  Once corporations realized that the rating framework is guiding investor 
decisions, they would be motivated to secure good ratings, including by improving environmental 
performance.  
 




Establishment of a new ESG framework would not start from a blank slate, but instead build on 
existing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings.  The new framework would use 
existing ESG rating agencies and practices as a foundation and add three key features lacking in 
the current ESG space:  1) standardized criteria and methods; 2) comprehensive and detailed 
information about companies’ GHG emissions; 3) government oversight and regulation.  It would 
also draw on elements of the credit rating system, including how it is regulated.  The new 
framework would also incorporate recommendations of the Sustainability Accounting Standards 
Board (SASB) (SASB, 2016) and the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) 
(TCFD, 2020), and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) for guidelines on which criteria rating 
agencies should use and what information rated companies should disclose in order to facilitate 
accurate, complete ratings. 
  
Current ESG ratings are already a common source of information for investors about how 
corporations are managing their impact on the environment, but they are not sufficiently credible 
or consistent to serve as an authoritative framework of ESG accountability.  The main deficiency 
of current ESG ratings is their lack of standardization.  There are over a hundred ESG rating 
services and data providers (Holger, 2020), each using different methodologies and criteria for 
rating a company’s environmental, social, and corporate governance performance.  There is 
consequently a wide range of results, and it is unclear which ones, if any, accurately represent the 
relative performance of companies within a particular sector.  Without a clear picture of which 
companies are leading or trailing based on environmental criteria, e.g. on managing GHG 
emissions, it is difficult for investors to assess the relative risk of investing in one firm or another 
and to direct their capital accordingly.   
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Current ESG ratings also place insufficient emphasis or weighting on GHG emissions, which are 
the single most significant indicator of a company’s contribution to global warming (IPCC, 2018).  
This is likely at least partly due to the shortage of comprehensive data about corporate GHG 
emissions, as well as the absence of regulation requiring companies to disclose their emissions 
(Heap, 2020).  Lacking necessary standards, emphasis on GHG emissions, data, and regulatory 
support, the current ratings fail to provide investors a reliable basis on which to make informed 
climate risk-driven investment decisions (Almono et al., 2019).  A standardized, consistent ESG 
rating framework would reveal high- and low-performers, allowing investors, advocates, media, 
and policymakers to hold them accountable in their respective domains.  Conversely, companies 
ranked among their peers within an authoritative ESG rating framework would have added 
competitive incentive to improve their ESG performance and attain a higher score, including by 
transitioning to more sustainable business strategies and practices.  
Research goal 
 
The goal of my research was to identify a practical, low-cost, relatively non-controversial way to 
create such a framework (for holding companies accountable for their impact on the environment 
and motivate them to reduce their GHG emissions).  The Methodology section of this paper 
describes my review of literature on relevant accountability frameworks, i.e. corporate ESG and 
credit ratings, and how they could be supplemented and modified into a more effective approach.  
The results section shares my findings on what such a modified approach would look like, and the 
discussion section provides recommendations on how to implement it.  The contribution of this 
paper is a policy proposal for a market-based framework of accountability that would increase 
competitive pressure on fossil fuel producers to reduce their GHG emissions. The proposed 
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framework would be based on current ESG rating methods and metrics as well as elements of the 






My research project had three parts:  The first part is a review of literature on ESG rating practices 
and how effective they are at motivating oil and gas corporations to adopt more environmentally 
friendly business practices.  ESG or sustainability ratings have been produced by reputable firms 
and widely used by major investors for decades, but the impact of ratings on the rated corporations 
is unclear.  I looked for evidence of impact and what might limit or enhance it, and whether ratings 
could serve as a tool for focusing investor pressure on major polluters.  The second part of my 
research compared ESG ratings with corporate credit ratings, including their organizational 
features, influence, and how they are regulated.  I explored why, despite superficial similarities, 
ESG and credit ratings are in different leagues in terms of their reliability and influence.  Thirdly, 
I drew on elements from both ESG ratings and credit ratings to craft a proposal for a new ESG 
framework for holding corporations accountable for their emissions and motivating them to adopt 
more sustainable technologies and practices.   
 
Assessing existing ESG ratings 
 
Research for this paper included a review of scholarly, business, and government publications on 
the effectiveness of existing ESG ratings and rating practices in influencing corporate behavior, 
e.g. to reduce GHG emissions.  This included reviewing the history of ESG ratings and how they 
work, their effects on investor decision-making and rated companies, limitations on the 
effectiveness of the ratings, and possible ways to overcome these limitations.  The focus of the 
paper is on global warming and how to motivate companies to help mitigate it.  I therefore 
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concentrated almost exclusively on the “E” of ESG ratings, and more specifically on GHG 
emissions.  I chose to study ESG ratings because of their increasing popularity in the investment 
community; apparent potential to influence investors, markets, and corporations; staying power; 
and accessibility online.  While there are dozens of ESG rating/data providers and research 
services, I confined my research to the largest and most prominent firms with a global perspective, 
since information about them was most accessible and presumably representative of the overall 
group’s strengths, weaknesses and potential.  
 
Comparing ESG ratings with credit ratings:  in search of an alternative model 
 
I researched differences and commonalities between ESG ratings and a more stablished, more 
influential rating system, i.e. corporate credit ratings.  I reviewed academic and trade literature for 
explanations of why credit ratings are more consistent and impactful than ESG ratings, and 
whether the key differences lie with the respective rating processes, producers, consumers, 
oversight and/or other factors.  I also reviewed regulatory decisions and trends relevant to the credit 
rating system and the ESG space, and considered the scope for reinforcing ESG ratings with 
elements of the credit rating system. 
 
Proposing a new approach 
 
Lastly, I drew on news, trade, and academic articles about ESG and credit ratings, as well as 
political, climate action, and industry trends to put together a proposal for a new accountability 
framework for corporate emissions.  Rather than reinventing the wheel, the proposal attempts to 
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build on existing ESG practices, by applying credit rating best practices and taking advantage of 
the above-mentioned trends.   
 
The proposal assumes 1) the new U.S. administration will attempt to implement climate-related 
pledges by President-elect Biden, including by mandating corporate climate risk disclosures; 2) 
despite currently weak market demand, fossil fuel production will remain on a trajectory that is 
incompatible with Paris targets unless investors and policymakers impose greater transparency and 
accountability on the producers; 3) the new administration will need a wide range of policy 
measures to meet its climate goals, including some that do not require legislative approval.  The 
proposal is aimed at reducing corporate GHG emissions and designed to be low-cost and 






Existing ESG ratings have limited influence over corporate behavior 
 
Abundance of ESG rating services and methods creates conflicting results.  Over 100 
independent, third party services or non-profit organizations research, assess and compare publicly 
traded corporations based on a wide range of environmental, social, and corporate governance 
criteria (Holger, 2020; Huber, 2017).  The first ESG ratings appeared in the 1980s in response to 
investor interest in socially responsible, “green” and sustainable investing (Dillenberg, 2020; Berg, 
2019).  A handful of firms such as MSCI, Sustainalytics, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, 
RepRisk, SSI, and RobeccoSAM (purchased by S&P in 2019 (Nauman, 2019b)) lead the ESG 
ratings market.  Some raters, such as Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), are non-profit and climate 
action-oriented, but most are for-profit firms that charge investors and other users for access to the 
ratings and related data.   
 
ESG rating providers serve as information intermediaries that collect and analyze a large amount 
of complex data about corporate ESG performance and, based on their analysis, generate easily 
understood scores and rankings of corporations that investors can use to guide investment 
decisions (Caprio, 2012).  Investors, environmental advocates, policymakers, and others can use 
the ratings to track and compare companies’ risk exposure to climate change or progress towards 
meeting Paris Agreement targets.  Rated companies can use the assessments to identify areas for 
improvement, to inform stakeholders, or for marketing and public relations purposes (Doyle, 
2018).  ESG ratings can encourage companies to be more transparent and at least announce targets 
for reducing emissions (Flood, 2019).  As environmentally sustainable investing becomes more 
the norm than exception, businesses have become increasingly attentive to ESG ratings that 
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highlight their ESG performance (WEF, 2020).  But the ratings are inconsistent, limiting their 
credibility with investors and impact on corporate behavior.  
 
A 2020 study titled “Aggregate Confusion: the Divergence of ESG Ratings,” by researchers at 
MIT Sloan and the University of Zurich highlighted ESG ratings’ inconsistency.  According to the 
study, the ratings of over 900 companies by six leading ESG rating services had an average 
correlation of just 0.54 (out of a possible 1.0, or 100%), which is far lower than that of corporate 
credit ratings by Moody’s and S&P, which is 0.99 (Berg, 2019).  Other studies have found even 
lower correlations, including 0.53 among ESG ratings of four leading data providers (State Street, 
2019), and 0.32 between ratings of MSCI and Sustainalytics (Doyle, 2018).  The low correlation 
among ESG ratings compared to credit ratings can be explained at least in part by the lack of an 
agreed concept of sustainability or ESG performance (both of which incorporate values-based as 
well as quantitative factors), while creditworthiness is well defined, but there are methodological 
and other reasons as well (Berg, 2019).  
 
Inconsistency of ESG ratings limits their influence with investors.  Despite concerns about 
consistency, most institutional investors rely to some degree on ESG research from ESG rating 
services and other data providers (MacMahon, 2020).  Investors would likely incorporate ESG 
ratings more fully in decisions if the ratings were more reliable (Poh, 2019).  A common complaint 
from investors is that rating services often produce divergent assessments and ratings for the same 
company.  This makes “apples to apples” comparisons difficult and leaves ratings users unsure of 
how environmentally sustainable a firm is relative to its peer group (Mutua, 2019).  For example, 
an oil and gas major may be rated as an environmental laggard in one rating, while a leader or 
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merely average in another (State Street, 2020; WEF, 2020).  A firm ranked in the upper five percent 
of one rating may well rank in the bottom 20 percent of another (Mirchandani, 2020).  Because of 
the variability of the ratings, interested investors (and policymakers and activists) must choose 
which ratings to rely upon and which to ignore.   
 
The lack of consistency and coherence among ESG ratings diminishes their influence in guiding 
investors and their capital.  Obscured by mixed signals, ESG ratings fail to provide a clear, 
“actionable” picture of how companies are managing their impact on the environment.  Investors 
committed to managing their exposure to climate risk must navigate a crowded sea of diverse 
ratings for clues on various corporation’s relative environmental sustainability (Doyle, 2018).  A 
more reliable and credible ESG rating framework would have greater impact and influence on 
corporate behavior, by identifying for investors the ESG leaders and laggards, thus improving or 
weakening their reputations and access to financing (Sustainalytics, 2020; WEF 2020).   
 
Inconsistency of ESG ratings limits their influence with rated corporations.  Public 
corporations are both subjects and users of ESG ratings (MacMahon, 2020).  Like investors, rated 
companies seeking actionable insights from ESG ratings.  My research, however, found no clear 
evidence that companies are adjusting business practices or strategies based on ESG ratings.  ESG 
ratings have so far failed to translate investor concern into significant impact on corporate 
behavior.  The lack of consistency and credibility of current ESG ratings likely deprives them of 
the leverage that credit ratings can exert on rated companies.  Although there is evidence 
companies that achieve high ESG ratings also outperform rivals on financial metrics such as share 
valuation and access to capital (MSCI, 2020), it is not clear there is a causal connection, i.e. that 
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strong ESG ratings contribute to higher share values or cheaper access to financing.  Similarly, 
although some oil and gas companies have achieved higher ESG scores by committing to transition 
from fossil fuels to lower emission technologies (e.g. Ørsted, BP, Equinor) (MacMahon, 2020), 
there are no data suggesting ESG ratings played a key role in motivating corporate management 
to speed up the firms’ energy transitions. 
 
On the contrary, divergent ESG ratings leave oil and gas companies indifferent to them or at least 
undeterred from pursuing business as usual.  Without a rigorous, competitive rating framework, 
oil and gas firms can manipulate or ignore their environmental scores without fear of being held 
accountable or having to reduce their GHG emissions (Doyle, 2018; State Street, 2019).  
Companies seeking an accurate appraisal of how their management of climate risk stacks up 
against the competition are left in the dark.  There are indications, however, that more companies 
are paying attention to ESG ratings.  The growing number of corporations willing to participate in 
surveys and other data collection by rating services suggests corporations recognize the value of 
at least cooperating with the rating process (McMahon, 2020).   
 
Why ESG ratings lack consistency and impact on corporate behavior   
 
There are multiple causes of ratings variability, including differences in rating methods, metrics, 
and weighting, data used, and rater focus/bias (Doyle, 2018).  Current ratings are not standardized, 
coordinated, or regulated, and each rating service has its own way of assessing and ranking 
companies or their financial instruments (e.g. bonds).  No approach or rating provider is accepted 
as the standard, none is a clear market leader.  Some rating services follow standards for measuring 
and reporting companies’ sustainability recommended by corporate sustainability organizations 
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such as the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the Task Force on Climate-
related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), but rating services as a whole have yet to adopt a common 
set of standards (Silk, 2020).   
 
One area of variability is the different terms and benchmarks ESG rating and data providers use to 
compare corporations’ ESG performance, or sustainability.  ESG assessments for Royal Dutch 
Shell illustrate this variability.  Shell is one of the largest emitters of CO2 among oil and gas 
producers over the past 50 years (Climate Accountability Institute, 2019), responsible for 80 
million metric tons of direct and indirect (Scope 1 and 2) CO2 equivalent emissions in 2019 (Shell, 
2020).  The company received an overall “A” rating for sustainability (on a scale from CCC to 
AAA among oil majors, AAA being the best possible) from ESG rating service MSCI (MSCI, 
2020 ).  Another leading ESG ratings firm, Sustainalytics, rated Shell as “high risk,” or 46th best 
among 285 oil and gas firms (Sustainalytics, 2020).   The Wall Street Journal ESG research team 
ranked Shell the 33rd most sustainably managed company in the world, i.e. among all companies 
and sectors, not just other oil and gas companies (WSJ ESG research team, 2020).  CDP, an 
environmental risk measurement and management non-profit, ranked Shell third best among 24 of 
the largest oil and gas companies on readiness for the transition to a low carbon economy (Fletcher, 
2018).   
 
Rating methodology and choice of criteria can determine whether a rating will highlight a 
company’s strong or weak performance on environmental criteria, and whether the rating will 
motivate a company to improve.  If the methodology assigns greater weight to environmental (E) 
indicators such as consumption of water or energy than to GHG emissions, the latter can be 
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overshadowed in the overall E score (Berg, 2019).  In such a scenario, a company that is a leading 
GHG emitter could still obtain an overall high E score (Boffo, 2020).  Similarly, the overall E 
score can be outweighed by the S or G scores if the methodology accords such factors such as 
charitable donations, employee relations, board oversight, and shareholder engagement higher 
overall significance (Escrig-olmedo, Muñoz-torres, Fernández-izquierdo, & Rivera-lirio, 2014).  
Some rating services accord GHG emissions lower priority in the environmental (E) dimension of 
ESG scores, focusing on other indicators such as toxic waste handling or financing, depending on 
the companies being rated (Russell Investments, 2018; Boffo, 2020).  Once consequence of such 
a rating approach is that corporate emitters are not held fully accountable for GHG emissions and 
not subject to pressure to reduce emissions. 
Different criteria and insufficient emphasis on GHG emissions.  Most rating services base 
their ratings on criteria and indicators they consider “material” to the financial performance of a 
rated company (e.g. regulatory, reputational, market changes, or supply chain interruption), not 
necessarily those that measure the impact of the company on the environment (e.g. pollution, GHG 
emissions) (WEF, 2020; Douglas, 2017).  Based on the rating service’s definition of materiality, 
the service may therefore rate a company high for environmental performance based on how well 
it manages environmental risks to its operations or financial health rather even though the company 
is doing long-term damage to the environment through its GHG emissions.  Ratings that measure 
the climate risks faced by a company but not its impacts on the environment provide investors only 
half of the story, and fail to hold the company accountable.  The investor community is demanding 
greater transparency and guidance about both the risk exposure and environmental impact of 
publicly traded corporations, particularly regarding GHG emissions (Carney, 2020).  Raters and 
investors are increasingly acknowledging that a company’s impact on the environment is also a 
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source of financial risk for the company, e.g. from regulatory, legal, or activist action or 
reputational damage (WEF, 2020; RepRisk, 2020).  The Wall Street Journal, for example, ranks 
companies higher for “balancing” environmental responsibilities with growth and profits (WSJ, 
2020).  However, it is not unusual for rating services to omit or downplay a company’s impact on 
the environment, e.g. GHG emissions, on the assumption the impact is not material (Russell 
Investments, 2018).   
Limited and selective data.  Most rating services base their assessments on publicly available 
and corporation-provided information (Mutua, 2019), though some do not use the latter because 
of concerns about its reliability (RepRisk, 2020).  There are no legal requirements for corporations 
to disclose information about their exposure to climate-related risk.  While voluntary disclosures 
have been increasing in recent years (TCFD, 2020), they are still often incomplete and selective 
(Sardon, 2020).  Oil and gas firms in particular are reluctant to share information that could be 
embarrassing.  Much of what they do disclose is filtered in order to cast the firms’ ESG records in 
the best possible light, or excludes the most potentially embarrassing data, e.g. about GHG 
emissions (Burita, 2018).  In 2017, the TCFD recommended 11 climate-related disclosures 
corporations should include in their annual financial filings, including on GHG emissions, but as 
of June 2019, fewer than 4% of companies were fully implementing the recommendations (TCFD, 
2019).  
Rating bias and conflict of interest.  Without a standard methodology, rating services’ biases 
and subjective interpretations of data can skew ratings (Doyle, 2018).  For example, companies 
with greater market capitalization score higher on ESG ratings than smaller firms in the same 
sector, and companies in regions with mandatory reporting requirements score better than their 
competitors in regions without mandatory reporting (Burita, 2018).  A study comparing ratings of 
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different rating services found that subjectivity was a factor in ratings variability (Mayor, 2019).  
While ESG rating services generally do not charge rated companies a fee to be rated (unlike credit 
rating agencies), the lack of transparency surrounding ESG rating practices raises concerns about 
possible conflicts of interest (Doyle, 2018).  The lack of corporate ESG disclosure requirements 
and auditing of ESG rating services hinders due diligence and verification.   
Comparing ESG ratings with corporate credit ratings 
 
ESG ratings share several characteristics with corporate credit ratings, including overlapping user 
base, participation of the “big three” firms of S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, and a role in protecting 
investors (Berg, 2019).  But credit ratings are far more established, authoritative, and effective at 
influencing corporate behavior in contrast to ESG ratings (Doyle, 2018; Kisgen, 2019).  Corporate 
credit ratings hold corporations accountable for their financial performance more noticeably than 
ESG ratings hold corporations accountable for their ESG performance.  There are several reasons 
for this difference in influence, beginning with the narrower scope and purpose of credit ratings.  
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) assess the credit quality of corporate bonds and, by extension, the 
corporations that issue them.  The ratings (e.g. AAA, AA, BBB) measure the rated corporation’s 
financial condition, its relative strength within its sector, and ability to meet financial 
commitments.   
 
Unlike ESG ratings, credit ratings are based on uniform, specific criteria, including a company’s 
“financial condition, liquidity and capital resources, changes in financial condition and results of 
operations” (SEC, 2010).  A key difference between ESG and credit ratings is that the latter are 
buttressed by government regulation, including:  1) government oversight and quality control over 
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CRAs, 2) CRAs’ semi-regulatory role in the financial system, and 3) mandatory corporate 
disclosures of information that rating agencies need in order to make accurate, complete 
assessments (Nauman, 2020, March 4; SEC, n.d.b).  
 
CRAs are regulated to ensure compliance with standards.  Credit rating agencies are 
regulated by governments around the world, including in the United States (S&P, n.d.).  The U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates CRAs to ensure they meet operational and 
reporting standards, including disclosure of rating methodologies and consistent application of 
rating procedures (SEC, 2006; SEC n.d. b).  The SEC also administers a formal registration process 
that distinguishes CRAs that are meeting SEC standards from those that do not.  This process 
promotes quality control and fraud prevention.  To register, CRAs must meet criteria for earning 
the status of nationally recognized statistical reporting organizations (NRSROs) (SEC, n.d.).  
These criteria include the CRA’s operational capability and reliability, which are assessed based 
on the agency’s organizational structure, financial resources, size and quality of personnel; and 
independence from its clients, e.g. the companies it rates (SEC, 2003).  The criteria have had the 
effect of excluding unqualified raters but also restricting the list of NRSROs to a small number 
including the “big three,” Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch (White, 2010).   
 
The financial crisis of 2007 led to additional oversight and regulation over the credit rating system 
as a result of its perceived failure to foresee the crisis and warn investors about it in a timely 
manner (PRNewswire, 2009).  In 2008 and 2009 the SEC began requiring rating firms to disclose 
more information about their data and methodologies (Scannell, 2008).  The regulations aimed to 
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increase transparency in the credit ratings and restrict conflicts of interest in which rating personnel 
might be tempted to put profit ahead of quality (White, 2010; Scannell, 2008b).    
 
CRAs have semi-regulatory authority.  Through their long history and formal registration 
under SEC authority, CRAs have acquired a semi-official status in supporting the SEC’s mission 
of protecting investors (Caprio, 2012).  In the 1930s, U.S. financial regulators responsible for 
investor safety largely outsourced the role of assessing creditworthiness of securities and their 
issuers to CRAs, whose ratings thereby acquired the force of law (White, 2010).  While subsequent 
legislation rolled back some of this authority (SEC, n.d.b), CRAs retain a pre-eminent role in 
judging corporate creditworthiness.   
 
Credit ratings are supported by mandatory disclosures.  Unlike ESG ratings, credit ratings 
benefit from legislation requiring companies to share data the CRAs need to produce meaningful, 
reliable ratings.  Specifically, publicly traded corporations with more than $10 million in assets 
are required by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to disclose information material to their 
financial performance (SEC (n.d. c).   Companies disclose this material information in mandatory 
annual reports known as 10-K filings, or in other publicly available reports.  These filings 
providing credit rating services the data they need to assess a corporation’s financial performance, 
risk, and creditworthiness.  
 
The materiality requirement does not specify precisely what type of information companies must 
disclose or how they should disclose it.  The SEC’s “guidance” to companies on the requirements 
is general and “principle-based” rather than detailed prescriptions of what specific data companies 
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must disclose (SEC, 2020). The SEC’s 2010 interpretive guidance on reporting requirements 
related to climate change encourages companies to disclose information about their climate risk, 
but the guidance is general and not mandatory.  It recommends, for example, that “…businesses 
[that] may be vulnerable to severe weather or climate related events should consider disclosing 
material risks of, or consequences from, such events in their publicly filed disclosure documents” 
(SEC, 2010).  This guidance affords corporations considerable flexibility in deciding what data are 
material and whether to disclose them in annual filings (Stevenson, 2019).  Many corporations 
consider GHG emissions not to be material to their operations or financial condition and therefore 
do not disclose emission levels or plans for managing them (CERES, 2010). Although each year 
more companies include GHG data as part of their annual reports, current GHG disclosures in 
general are not sufficient to allow detailed analysis or meaningful comparisons between carbon-
intensive companies.  
 
CRAs are independent and profitable (despite being regulated).  Despite the additional 
regulation, CRAs are still largely independent and profitable, with a market size in the United 
States alone of $11.7 billion (IBIS, 2020).  SEC exercises oversight but does not have the authority 
to decide credit ratings or the specific methodologies or criteria used by rating services to formulate 
their ratings (Kane, 2020).   
 
Credit ratings are highly influential.  The net result of semi-regulatory authority, government 
oversight, and mandatory corporate disclosures of information essential to raters and regulations 
ensuring standardization as well as oversight is that the credit ratings are authoritative and 
impactful.  The ratings are widely respected as sources of accurate, consistent, comparable, and 
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relevant information.  They are publicly available and highly influential since investors trust them 
and rely on them heavily when making decisions about whether to invest in a corporation.  In order 
to remain competitive, rated corporations must take the ratings seriously, since a good or bad rating 
could affect their ability to sell bonds, obtain financing and continue growing.  For example, a 
company’s stock or bond price will likely decline and its credit spread will increase if its credit 
rating is downgraded (Caprio, 2012; SEC, 2003; Hand, 1992).  Credit ratings are therefore 
powerful instruments for holding corporations accountable for meeting their financial 
commitments and managing financial risks.   
 
ESG ratings modeled after credit ratings would be more influential.  Applying key 
elements of the credit rating system such as regulation, mandatory corporate disclosures, NRSRO 
standardization to ESG ratings would likely make the latter more consistent and influential.  There 
is evidence that companies respond to being rated on ESG criteria when the rating provider and 
rating framework are credible and authoritative.  For example, after several corporate credit rating 
agencies began including ESG metrics in their credit ratings, some rated companies began taking 
steps to improve their ESG performance in order to gain a competitive edge in the ratings (Dow 
Jones, 2019).  If ESG rating services could acquire a level of credibility and consistency 
approaching that of CRAs, corporations would likely adapt their strategies to improve ESG ratings 
also.   
 
Proposing a new approach:  an ESG rating framework based on credit ratings  
 
ESG ratings enjoy a growing readership and clientele in the financial services and climate action 
arenas.  The ratings could be more useful and impactful in reducing GHG emission if they 1) 
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incorporated features of the credit rating system and 2) focused more rigorously on greenhouse 
gas emissions.  The resulting ratings would collectively make up a framework of accountability 
that would help and protect investors and motivate fossil fuel companies (especially oil and gas 
majors) to lower carbon emissions.  The framework would establish clear and uniform “rules of 
the game” for rating services and rated companies.  Just as the corporate credit ratings provide a 
framework for protecting investors from undisclosed financial risk, ESG ratings could play a 
similarly valuable role in protecting investors from undisclosed climate risk.  As with the credit 
rating system, the new ESG rating framework would be independent and market-based but involve 
government regulation and oversight.  The new framework would also leverage investor interest 
in managing risk to motivate corporate environmental performance.  The goal of the framework 
would be to help ensure that every important corporate decision takes climate change into account 
(Carney, 2020).   
 
Key elements of such a framework would include:  
 
Government regulation to ensure quality and integrity. The U.S. government would 
establish an oversight and registration system for ESG rating services regulated by the SEC, similar 
to that established for credit rating agencies.  Policymakers would model regulations on provisions 
of the U.S. Credit Agency Reform Act (CRA) of 2006, which requires credit agencies that wish to 
obtain the status of a “nationally recognized statistical rating organization” (NRSRO) to meet 
minimum standards of transparency, credibility and reliability (Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, 
2006).  The new ESG framework would include elements of the 2006 Act that aimed to promote 
competition among registered credit rating services and provided investors with greater choice, 
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better quality ratings, at lower cost (Kane, 2020).  Policymakers would also draw on the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, which increased government 
oversight of credit rating agencies and established greater scrutiny of large corporations. 
 
ESG rating services that wished to become NRSROs (or a similar designation under a different 
name) would be required to apply to the SEC and to provide in their applications and subsequent 
annual reports information about their rating methodologies, criteria, clients, and any potential 
conflicts of interest.  Eligibility requirements would include (1) national recognition (i.e., the 
applicant is recognized as an issuer of credible and reliable ratings by the predominant users of 
ESG ratings in the United States); (2) adequate staffing, expertise, management and financial 
resources to issue credible and reliable ratings of the sustainability of issuers and withstand 
economic pressure from clients (rated companies); (3) use of systematic rating 
procedures/methodologies intended to produce credible and accurate ratings; (4) internal controls 
to protect nonpublic information from misuse (SEC, 2003).  The registration process and resulting 
oversight would improve standardization and consistency.  
 
The SEC would establish an office similar to the one created in 2012 to monitor credit rating 
agencies, the Office of Credit Ratings (OCR), to (1) protect ESG rating users and the general 
public; (2) improve accuracy of ESG ratings; (3) reduce the potential for conflicts of interest; (4) 
establish standards for registrants, review and decide on applications for NRSRO status (Kane 
2020).  The office for overseeing ESG ratings (perhaps the Office of ESG Ratings, OER) should 
conduct annual inspections of each ESG rating service registered as a NRSRO and issue a public 
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report on key findings regarding compliance with standards (Kane, 2020).  The SEC would revoke 
NRSRO status of ESG rating services that fail to meet established standards.   
 
Standardization to improve consistency.  OER regulators would develop a broad set of rating 
principles and standards for ensuring quality and consistency of rating criteria and methodologies, 
based on recommendations of the Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure (Global 
Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure, 2006), TCFD and SASB, as well as on SEC standards 
for credit rating agencies.  The criteria and methodologies would explicitly include metrics for 
current and projected GHG emissions (see below).  Standards would include transparency, 
accuracy, consistency, and completeness in ESG ratings and reporting.  Regulators would take into 
account comments from the public, affected companies, international organizations and 
government agencies before finalizing standards, consistent with standard rulemaking procedures.  
The OER would invite ESG rating services to apply for NRSRO status and would use the approved 
rating standards and principles to determine eligibility.  
 
Registered ESG rating services would need to adapt their rating practices to meet SEC standards 
in order to attain NRSRO status and the accompanying credibility and validation.  Rating services 
would have to be transparent and consistent in applying standard benchmarks for assessing and 
rating corporate sustainability (unlike under current free-for-all ESG rating practices).  However, 
the proposed Office of ESG Ratings (OER) would set standards for NRSROs that are general 
enough to allow rating services to maintain their individual areas of focus, interpretations of data, 
and analyses.  In this way, registered rating services would to a large extent be able to maintain 
their independence and market-based (or non-governmental) character.  The resulting ratings 
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framework would be standardized and regulated but also competitive and self-sustaining, as with 
the credit rating system. 
 
Emissions-focused ratings:  adding an EGHG, score.  Most significant among SEC standards 
for the new ESG framework would be a requirement that registered ESG rating agencies provide 
a stand-alone emissions, or “EGHG,” score for each company they rate.  The EGHG score would 
indicate how well each rated company is managing its greenhouse gas emissions, both in terms of 
risks to itself and risks to the environment.  The EGHG score would be based on GHG emissions-
related metrics, including current and projected GHG emissions, emissions intensity, and plans for 
reducing GHG emissions through the full life-cycle of produced GHGs, including scope 1-3 
emissions (TCFD, 2020; Fletcher, 2018).   The SEC would encourage rating services to use a 
standard protocol for GHG accounting and reporting, endorsed by a reputable sustainability 
organization such as SASB or the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (Greenhouse Gas Protocol, n.d.).    
 
“That which gets measured gets managed.”  The purpose of the new EGHG score would be 
to highlight for investors the single-most important indicator of a company’s contribution to (or 
mitigation of) global warming, i.e. GHG emissions, and ensure this metric is not diluted or over-
shadowed by other climate-risk metrics.  A specific, unadulterated, emissions-centric score would 
also add pressure on fossil fuel companies to manage and lower their emissions.  Easily 
understood, standardized, and widely available rankings of companies based on their emissions 
management would create competition among major emitters to devise more effective strategies 
for lowering emissions and achieving better EGHG scores.  EGHG scores would supplement, not 
replace E and ESG scores.  Rating agencies would continue issuing conventional E and ESG scores 
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since these scores reflect a wide range of environmental, social, and governance performance 
indicators relevant to investment decisions.  The SEC would require rating services to incorporate 
SASB and/or TCFD recommendations so that EGHG, E, and ESG scores adequately represent how 
well a company is managing its emissions.   
 
Paris-aligned and science-based standards.  A key ESG rating benchmark would be the 
alignment of a company’s current and projected greenhouse gas emissions with targets established 
by the Paris Climate Agreement (Almono, 2019).  Rating agencies would assess whether 
corporations that are not on a Paris-compatible pathway have realistic and science-based plans to 
get there.  Raters would include in their ratings an assessment of how well a corporation’s plans 
for reducing emissions are grounded in science, based on recommendations from credible sources 
such as Science Based Targets (Science Based Targets, n.d.).   
 
Reduction-oriented.  To support the goal of motivating companies to reduce their greenhouse 
emissions, the new ESG rating framework would assign more value to companies’ direct emissions 
reductions than to indirect cuts.  For example, companies would receive a higher EGHG or E score 
for reducing methane leaks or increasing the percentage of renewables in their energy consumption 
than, for example, buying unbundled renewable energy credits (RECs) or other offset credits 
(Almono, 2019).  Investments in clean energy would also count. Companies would get credit for 
avoided GHG emissions achieved through investments, e.g. in wind power or other renewable 




Mandatory disclosures of climate-risk data.  In keeping with President-elect Biden’s 
November 2 pledge (Whieldon, 2020), the SEC would require corporations to disclose climate-
risk related data recommended by SASB and TCFD, in particular total GHG emissions, future 
reductions targets, avoided emissions, and plans for reaching Paris-aligned levels (BlackRock, 
2020; Dietz, 2018).  The SEC would update its 2010 guidance on climate risk disclosures to 
explicitly state that it considers corporate GHG emissions and other impacts on the environment 
to be material for carbon-intensive corporations such as fossil fuel producers.  The updated 
guidance would be more specific and prescriptive about what types of climate-risk data 
corporations must include in their annual filings, again, drawing from SASB and TCFD 
recommendations.  Ratings services would therefore have access to more complete and uniform 
data.  Ratings would better reflect how well a firm is managing its climate risk exposure as well 







The worsening effects of greenhouse gases and global warming on the environment and economy 
(e.g. UNEP, 2020;  WMO, 2020) have increased investor demand for reliable ESG data and ratings 
(Jebe, 2019).  The investment community wants more transparent, consistent, accurate information 
about corporate GHG emissions and other environmental risks in order to make better-informed 
investment decisions (Carney, 2020).  Sustainability organizations and climate activists also seek 
ESG data to hold corporations accountable and pressure them to adopt more sustainable business 
practices.   ESG ratings in their current form are not sufficient to compete with well-established 
market incentives driving fossil fuel companies to continue exploring, extracting, and producing 
oil and gas.  However, if bolstered by greater credibility, transparency, and focus on emissions, 
ESG ratings could provide the basis for an effective new accountability framework.  The more 
robust ESG framework proposed by this paper would provide two elements missing from current 
ratings:  1) accurate, comprehensive, comparable information about GHG emissions and other 
climate risks faced and/or created by corporations, and 2) a transparent, effective accountability 
structure for assessing and comparing how companies mitigate and manage those risks.  The two 
elements would allow investors and policymakers to leverage competitive pressure and hard data 
about climate-related risk to drive down corporate GHG emissions.  
 
Implementation and limitations of the proposed framework 
 
A new emissions-centric ratings framework would of course not be a silver bullet, but rather serve 
as one of many market-based instruments in the climate policy toolbox to help put the United 
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States on a trajectory to reach carbon-neutrality by 2050.  The new framework would have to 
overcome several limitations and challenges.  First, to function as intended (as an accountability 
framework as well as a service to investors and corporate clients), the new ratings would require 
the active cooperation of all key players:  the SEC would need to adopt the proposed regulations 
on standardized, emissions-focused ratings and mandatory disclosures.  Rating services would 
have to apply for NRSRO status and meet SEC standards and regulations.  Oil and gas and other 
fossil fuel producers would have to accept the new framework, make the required disclosures, and 
align their business strategies with Paris targets.  
 
Will the SEC support greater ESG accountability under the Biden administration?  
The SEC has traditionally taken a conservative stance regarding proposed changes to corporate 
disclosure requirements (including on climate risk) or guidance to credit rating agencies on their 
methods and criteria.  Investors representing over $29 trillion in assets have urged the SEC to adopt 
rules requiring companies to disclose climate risks (Ceres, 2020).  But the SEC remains reluctant 
to overburden companies with additional specific reporting requirements or to depart from its long-
standing principles-based (vs. prescriptive) guidance on annual filings (SEC, 2020).  The SEC 
commissioners have expressed skepticism about the value and reliability of current ESG ratings 
(Clayton, 2020; Roisman, 2020) and opposed mandatory disclosure of ESG data (Jebe, 2019).   
 
SEC leadership and its stance on climate risk disclosures will likely change under the new 
administration.  President-elect Biden pledged on 2 November that he would sign an executive 
order requiring corporations to disclose climate-related risks, including GHG emissions 
(Whieldon, 2020).  Such an order would presumably require the SEC to issue new guidance to 
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credit rating agencies and rated corporations (Dow Jones, 2020).  It is unclear, however, how the 
Biden administration SEC would react to a proposal for creating a new ESG framework modeled 
after the credit rating system.  It is possible that the SEC would issue instructions requiring more 
robust ESG disclosures but not support a new ESG rating framework.  A subcommittee of the 
SEC Investor Advisory Committee began exploring options in May 2020 for ensuring investors 
have access to relevant climate-related information without having to rely on third party ESG 
data providers (SEC, 2020).  Current SEC commissioners remain divided on ESG matters and 
declined to include disclosure guidelines on environmental risk in an August 2020 update of 
corporate reporting requirements, despite thousands of public requests for such guidelines (Lee, 
2020).   
 
Why not combine credit ratings and ESG ratings?  If the SEC does decide to require 
corporations to disclose climate risks, it might rely on credit rating agencies to reflect these risks 
more systematically in their credit ratings, rather than creating a new ESG rating framework.  Some 
credit rating agencies, on their own initiative, have already begun including ESG factors with 
traditional financial risk factors in their ratings.  However, there are drawbacks to relying on credit 
rating agencies to produce ratings that incorporate ESG factors as well as financial factors.  For 
starters, CRAs already must consider a broad range of factors when assessing and rating a 
corporation’s financial condition and creditworthiness.  Increasing the number of issues to be 
measured and reflected in a credit score could lead to individual ESG factors such as emissions 
being diluted or obscured by the financial indicators on which credit ratings are traditionally based, 




The traditional focus of credit rating agencies on financially material indicators hinders makes 
them ill-suited to assess corporations based on climate-risk indicators, especially those 
recommended by TCFD, e.g. GHG emissions, which are not accepted by all CRAs and 
corporations as financially material.  As the financial consequences of global warming become 
increasingly obvious and measurable, CRAs will likely assign climate risk factors greater 
importance in their ratings of corporate creditworthiness.  Credit ratings will continue to reflect, 
however, a broad range of other corporate financial factors (in addition to climate-related ones).  
Credit ratings therefore should be supplemented (not combined) with standalone ESG and EGHG 
ratings to provide investors and other consumers with a fuller, more granular picture of corporate 
environmental performance.   
 
A separate emissions-centric ESG rating framework would best serve investors. The 
most effective way to highlight how well a company is managing climate-related risk relative to 
other companies would be through a standalone, standardized, emissions-focused ESG 
accountability framework, i.e. separate from credit ratings.  In addition to highlighting corporate 
climate impact and risk in a way that combined credit/ESG ratings would not, the standalone 
approach would build on a growing ESG market (currently valued at an estimated $200 million, 
with the potential to grow to $500 million by 2024 (Nauman, 2019)).  Despite their lack of 
consistency and reliability, ESG ratings enjoy growing usership in the investment community.  
Building on the parts of the existing ESG rating platform that work well (e.g. business model, 
organizational structure, expertise) would take advantage of accumulated experience, avoid 




To help investors manage climate risk, the EGHG score would be most effective as an obligatory 
and separate feature of ESG ratings, complementing the individual E, S, G scores and aggregate 
ESG scores.  Many ESG rating services already have the necessary expertise, experience, 
organization and personnel for analyzing and including GHG emission metrics in their ratings.  
Assuming the role of issuing a standardized EGHG score would be a more efficient and natural 
transition for ESG rating providers than for CRAs.  Some credit rating agencies such as Moody’s 
and S&P have shown their confidence in the future of the stand-alone ESG market by issuing their 
own ESG ratings, separate from their credit ratings (Nauman, 2019; 2019b).   
 
ESG rating services (and their fossil fuel-intensive clients) might resist a new ESG 
framework as unwanted meddling with their current (lucrative) ESG rating practices and business 
model.  Others would welcome the additional climate risk disclosures, clearer rules, and (for 
smaller rating firms) a level playing field.  The majority of ESG raters/data providers that are not 
also big three credit rating firms would also likely view a new framework that builds on existing 
ratings, rather than replacing them, as a better alternative to seeing ESG ratings absorbed by the 
credit rating agencies.  Some ESG raters may also prefer the proposed framework to possible 
heavier-handed regulation imposed on them by Congress, as experienced by CRAs in 2010 under 
Dodd-Frank legislation. 
 
The more established, better resourced ESG ratings/data providers might be more inclined to 
support the new framework since they are more likely to meet SEC criteria for becoming NRSROs, 
while smaller providers may not.  The NRSRO registration process for ESG raters would thus 
likely lead to the same consolidating effect that it had with registered CRAs, which currently 
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number about 10.  While consolidation might have an anti-competitive effect, the reduced number 
of rating providers would help achieve greater standardization, consistency and reliability among 
them as a group.   
 
Fossil fuel companies would likely resist any initiative intended to hold them more 
accountable for emissions and other impacts on the environment.  However, the stranglehold of 
fossil fuel interests over public policy discourses (Evans and Phelan, 2016) may be weakening, 
and the proposed market-based framework would likely provoke less opposition from industry 
than more interventionist measures such as a national cap and trade scheme or strict curbs on 
exploration or production.  Far from trying to shut down carbon-intensive companies, the proposed 
new ESG rating framework is designed to motivate them to accelerate changes in business strategy 
or practices they will eventually need to make to remain competitive.  In reaction to stricter EU 
climate policy measures, a few European oil and gas majors such as BP, Shell, and Equinor seem 
to be charting lower-carbon courses, though so far mostly on paper (BP, 2020; Shell, 2020; 
Equinor, 2020).  Facing growing pressure from investors, activists, and governments for greater 
emissions reductions and disclosures, some oil and gas companies may grudgingly accept a 
market-based accountability framework based on known models and administered by familiar 
players.  
 
How long will it take to implement?  Another challenge faced by the proposed framework is 
the time required to establish it.  It took decades for corporate credit ratings to reach their current 
level of reliability and authority and to become the standard for assessing and ranking companies 
according to financial criteria.  The foundation of the proposed framework, however, already 
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exists, and its approval and implementation could be accelerated by applying best practices and 
lessons learned from the credit rating system.  While any significant climate initiative will need to 
clear policymaking and regulatory hurdles, the proposed framework should require only executive, 




A review of ESG disclosures, ratings, and related regulatory initiatives underway in the European 
Union, China, and other countries might uncover insights applicable in the U.S. context but was 
beyond the scope of this research project.  Further research into how successfully former fossil 
fuel companies such as Ørsted have converted themselves into renewable energy firms (Ørsted, 
n.d.), or how the announced transitions of oil and gas majors such as BP and Equinor are 
progressing, would also help guide the development of policies aimed at motivating such 
companies to adopt lower-emission business strategies.  Also, new initiatives, players, and market 
dynamics are constantly emerging across the rapidly evolving ESG landscape.  My research was 
able to cover only a fraction of the developments that merit further study and incorporation in 




President-elect Biden has described climate change as the greatest threat facing the United States 
and pledged to ensure the country reaches net-zero emissions by 2050 (Biden campaign, 2020). 
Achieving this goal will likely require numerous policy measures of varying ambition and scope.  
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The new ESG rating framework proposed in this paper builds on recent regulatory and market 
trends, including rising investor pressure on corporations to reduce their environmental impact and 
exposure to climate risk.  The proposed framework would complement, not substitute for, other 
existing and proposed measures.  Though the success of even this modest proposal is far from 
assured, its relatively non-controversial, low-cost, and non-legislative approach would facilitate 
its adoption and implementation.  The proposed framework would also assert U.S. leadership on 
global financial and environmental regulation at a time when Europe and China are emerging as 
the de facto standard-setters and the world is demanding public and private action to prevent global 
warming from reaching crisis levels.   
The United States has a history of imposing regulations on the financial markets in the aftermath 
of devastating financial crises.  The 2001 Enron bankruptcy and aftermath, which inflicted billions 
in losses on investors, led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requiring companies to disclose more 
comprehensive and timely information about their financial condition and results; the 2008 sub-
prime mortgage crisis and stock market crash prompted the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, which tightened government oversight over credit ratings agencies.  
In retrospect, the need for such intervention was obvious well before the crises occurred.  The 
enormous climate risk exposure of major corporations and their financial backers calls for urgent 
preventive policy action.  The Biden administration should work with Congress to ensure history 
does not repeat itself, and implement measures establishing greater corporate disclosure and 
regulatory oversight in the ESG space.  A credible, reliable ESG accountability framework would 
be a small but positive step towards mitigating global warming and averting the first financial 
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